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CHRISTOPHER J. HORTON

Before the Hourglass Runs Out: A Solution to the
Impending Insolvency of Medicare Part A
ABSTRACT1
Health care dominates public attention and individual concern because it
is essential to a society’s well-being. Health insurance is ever-evolving. The
evolution of health care is largely attributed to political shifts that create and
amend health insurance systems. In 1965, under President Lyndon Johnson,
the Social Security Act passed with colossal health insurance systems—
Medicare and Medicaid.
Originally, Medicare provided health insurance for America’s elder
population. Medicare looks different now than at its inception. At the
beginning, Medicare was composed of only Parts A and B. Now, it houses
Parts A, B, C, and D. Parts B, C, and D are funded privately while Part A is
funded through payroll taxes and few premium-paying beneficiaries. This
expansion is costly—too costly.
The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) issued warnings
every year for the past four years. These warnings alert lawmakers and the
American people that Medicare Part A’s funding is depleting rapidly. It is
currently billions of dollars over budget with no end in sight due to everincreasing expenses. If no change occurs, the government’s promise to
provide health care to the elder population and others who are qualified is in
jeopardy.
1
The author does not argue that Medicare or government-subsidized health care is the
proper or best form of health insurance. However, the author is not under the illusion that
Medicare will ever be absent from the American health care system. Therefore, the author
presents only possible measures that the government may employ to remain faithful to its
promise to the American people that they will have health care in their old age.
Furthermore, this Comment is based on data from fiscal year 2020 provided by CMS and
other governmental agencies. Data from fiscal year 2021 includes expenses resulting from
the COVID-19 pandemic. The pandemic caused changes to Medicare Part A funding that
are atypical. This Comment focuses on issues relating to funding prior to the pandemic. An
analysis of the pandemic’s effect on Medicare is outside the scope of this Comment and
requires an article dedicated to it for full and proper treatment.
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The Obama Administration attempted to rectify Part A’s spending crisis.
One attempt, the hospital value-based purchasing program, allows CMS to
reimburse hospitals according to each hospital’s performance. CMS uses
several measures to calculate how the hospital performs. Performance-based
reimbursements shift the focus of delivering health care. Hospitals are
incentivized to produce efficient, quality care to attain the highest amount of
reimbursement. However, this program is not perfect. Hospitals may still
overtreat patients resulting in a heavy burden on Medicare.
This Comment offers a solution—lower health care costs combined with
a methodology to increase Medicare’s income. This solution is made possible
through two means. First, the hospital value-based purchasing program must
change to address hospital waste when treating patients. Change may come
in the form of an amendment to a statute governing the parameters of how a
hospital’s performance is judged. The amendment shall require the Secretary
of Health and Human Services to establish a parameter that measures
hospital waste.
The second solution involves enacting a statute imposing a mandatory
premium on all Part A beneficiaries. A mandatory premium provides
consistent income for Medicare even when the person is fully retired.
Premiums are used in Parts B and D, and garner successful results as both
programs have adequate funding. Further, semi-retirees continue to bear the
burden of Medicare by having Medicare payments withdrawn from their
paychecks. However, fully-retired beneficiaries do not pay the tax. Therefore,
a mandatory premium ensures consistent income for Part A and does not
disincentivize the semi-retired population.
Medicare is an expensive program with funds quickly depleting. People
expect Medicare upon reaching the age of sixty-five. However, the promise
of health care in one’s old age is in jeopardy absent Medicare Part A’s
necessary evolution.
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COMMENT
BEFORE THE HOURGLASS RUNS OUT:
A SOLUTION TO THE IMPENDING INSOLVENCY OF MEDICARE
PART A
Christopher J. Horton†
I. INTRODUCTION
Sickness, disease, injury, and the gradual decline of the human body is
inevitable. People seek security in their health in the form of preventive
medicine, regular check-ups, and insurance to ensure that they can receive
the necessary care. Throughout a lifetime, a person will spend thousands of
dollars every year in premiums, deductibles, and coinsurance payments to
obtain health care insurance. When the individual is working and has a
regular income, such expenses are manageable. However, members of the
elderly population usually cannot work the same number of hours or the
types of jobs they once could, yet they have an increased need of care that
requires insurance. For this reason, the Johnson Administration created
Medicare.2
In 1965, Medicare started as a program that provided health care to the
elderly population in a limited form.3 Eligibility for Medicare was narrow.4
However, Medicare drastically transformed over time. The eligibility
requirements drastically widened—granting coverage to those with
disabilities and specific conditions.5 Following Medicare’s enactment, it
†

Symposium Editor, LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, Volume 16; J.D. Candidate,
Liberty University School of Law (2022); Government Politics and Policy, B.S. with a minor
in Western Legal Traditions, summa cum laude, Liberty University (2019). This Comment
would not be possible without the endless support of my parents, my brother’s guidance and
example of perseverance, and the encouragement of my soon-to-be wife, Janna. Thank you to
every law professor at Liberty University who taught me how to think like a lawyer. To God
be the glory.
2
Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the U.S., Remarks with President Truman at the
Signing in Independence of the Medicare Bill (July 30, 1965), in U.C. SANTA BARBARA: THE
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarkswith-president-truman-the-signing-independence-the-medicare-bill (last visited Sept. 8,
2021).
3
Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., History, CMS.GOV, https://www.cms.gov/AboutCMS/Agency-Information/History (Jan. 13, 2020, 2:44 PM).
4
Id.
5
Id.
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transformed through several major additions. For example, the program
added two major parts allowing more services, drugs, and plans to be insured
for beneficiaries. The Obama Administration further altered Medicare by
introducing incentive-based care instead of solely quality-based care.6
Modern-day Medicare is different from the one founded in 1965.
Public policy is at the forefront of Medicare as the struggle ensues over the
provision of health care at an unsustainable price. People need health care;
however, the government cannot possibly afford the expense that the
American health care system demands to service millions of beneficiaries.
The tension becomes whether to expand Medicare coverage for only a few or
maintain a high number of insureds with minimized coverage.
While this issue seems nonexistent, or at least far in the future, the
inevitable truth faces lawmakers: Medicare in its present state is
unsustainable.7 The colossal program currently operates over budget by
billions of dollars.8 Medicare Part A’s insolvency is inevitable unless
lawmakers and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)—the
federal agency charged with operating Medicare and Medicaid—step in to
enact change.
This Comment argues that Medicare Part A is sustainable if health care
costs decrease, and the program’s income increases. It further proposes two
means of carrying out this generalized fix. First, Medicare should cover fewer
expenses charged by hospitals. The program will no longer cover wasteful
treatment, such as over-treatment of the patient. Second, all beneficiaries
should be subject to a mandatory premium regardless of whether the
beneficiary qualifies by meeting one of the eligibility requirements or
purchases the coverage. The mandatory premium statute will result in
consistent income for the Medicare program. Through these adjustments,
Part A may continue to provide health care for generations to come.

II. BACKGROUND
“No longer will older Americans be denied the healing miracle of modern
medicine. No longer will illness crush and destroy the savings that they so
carefully put away over a lifetime . . . .”9 These words, spoken by President
Johnson in 1965, reflect the purpose of Medicare and Medicaid as part of the

6
7
8
9

See id.
See H.R. DOC. NO. 116–122, at 8 (2020).
Id. at 6.
Johnson, supra note 2.
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Social Security Act.10 Medicare and Medicaid have transformed health care
by subsidizing costs for millions of elderly and less-fortunate Americans.
Specifically, Medicare is a program guaranteeing that retirees are no longer
burdened with high medical expenses as they age. From its inception to its
modern-day form, Medicare Part A provides far more expansive coverage
than before and reimburses medical service providers at higher prices.
A.

Medicare’s Debut

Little doubt exists that today’s Medicare program achieves the Johnson
Administration’s goal for Medicare. Presently, Medicare assumes the burden
of more coverage than when it was founded in 1965. This expansion allows
for more health care services for more Americans; however, with more
coverage comes higher costs. A brief examination of Medicare’s original
construction assists in understanding that the program provides expansive
coverage with insufficient funds to match the demand.
1.

Opening the Door for Government Subsidized Health Care

“Free health care for all” is not a recent development in the 21st century.11
Government-subsidized health care had its origin in the early 1900s.12
Throughout the first half of the 1900s, lawmakers proposed schemes of
government-provided health care but ultimately dismissed the legislation.13
In the latter half of the century, liberal politicians replaced their conservative
counterparts, thereby permitting substantive reform in health care through a
Democrat majority.14
Several factors contributed to Medicare’s enactment. First, playing on the
American mindset of refusing handouts, Medicare drafters introduced a
system whereby a person pays a small portion of each paycheck towards
anticipated health care costs upon reaching sixty-five.15 This effort sought to
resolve the tension created through the characterization of Medicare as an
abandonment of capitalist principles by the government providing “free”
health care.16 Second, some of the Democrats in Congress saw the need to
ensure that coverage included not only hospital care but also physician care,

10
Id.; see PROBLEMS IN HEALTH CARE LAW: CHALLENGES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 305 (John
E. Steiner, Jr. ed., 10th ed. 2014).
11
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. HEALTH LAW 743 (I. Glenn Cohen et al. eds., 2017).
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
See id. at 745.
15
Id. at 744.
16
See id. at 745.
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thereby giving Americans a choice in their providers.17 Lastly, Medicare’s
coverage was cabined purposely for the realities of legislative enactment.
Coverage excluded “the chronically sick elderly—medical conditions that
would not dramatically improve.”18
In 1965, these factors conglomerated to create the Medicare and Medicaid
amendments to the Social Security Act.19 At that time, Medicare had two
components, Parts A and B.20 The congressional intent behind enacting
Medicare is evidenced in Part A, as the Program provided coverage solely for
hospital care.21 Financially, each person’s paycheck funds Part A.22 In each
paycheck, a certain dollar amount is withdrawn in anticipation of the person
drawing on Medicare upon reaching the qualifying age.23
Part B provides different benefits with an alternative means of funding.
However, Part B reflected the intentions of the more hesitant and
conservative Democrat wing of Congress because it provides coverage for
physician care.24 Part B contrasts with Part A in how it is funded—Part B
receives funding directly from the individual beneficiary.25 Taxes do not
directly subsidize the program; rather, a person’s premiums generate the
necessary capital.26 To impose and enforce these regulations, Congress
established CMS as the governing agency.27 While Medicare originally
restricted coverage, the proceeding years demonstrated what Medicare truly
represented—government-subsidized health care for consistently growing
portions of the population.
B.

Medicare’s Expansion
Since 1965, Medicare has evolved into a program interacting with and
17

See THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. HEALTH LAW, supra note 11, at 745.
Id. at 746. Additionally, Democrat Senator Wilbur Mills proved to be more
conservative than his fellow Democrat colleagues by creating Medicaid and tacking it to
Medicare. Id. His intent was to prevent Medicare from providing further coverage. Id.
Senator Mills was cognizant of his colleagues’ desire not to cabin Medicare but expand
coverage to anyone. Id.
19
See generally id. at 746–47.
20
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. HEALTH LAW, supra note 11, at 747.
21
See id. at 746–47.
22
Id.
23
See PROBLEMS IN HEALTH CARE LAW: CHALLENGES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 10,
at 306.
24
See THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. HEALTH LAW, supra note 11, at 747.
25
See id.
26
Id.
27
JAMES F. BARGER, JR. ET AL., HEALTH CARE FRAUD: ENFORCEMENT AND
COMPLIANCE § 10.02 (Law Journal Press 1996).
18
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servicing more than the 65-year-old retiree. Like many other public
programs, it soon became apparent that change was needed to remedy issues
related to cost efficiency, payment and services, and social issues, like racism,
within the program. Congress and the executive branch recognized the needs
of Medicare and enacted amendments to reflect these changes. Additionally,
through the implementation of Parts C and D, Americans have more options
to pay health care expenses at a lower price.
1.

Changes Addressing Cost and Racism

Transformative changes mark Medicare’s evolution from its inception
through the 21st century. Following Medicare’s first operational year,
enrollment was at 19 million enrollees.28 Such a high and immediate demand
for services placed a burden on the program, which necessitated cost-efficient
measures.29 Congress recognized this issue shortly after the first year;
however, resolutions to address the high cost of care were unsuccessful
throughout the 1960s and ’70s.30
Change did not come until 1983 when the Reagan Administration
introduced a new payment system, the Prospective Payment System (PPS).31
This new system fundamentally transformed how Medicare payments were
issued. Before PPS, Medicare reimbursements were issued retroactively.32
Thus, payment was issued after the patient received care.33 PPS shifted the
focus of payment from retrospective to prospective by using a standardized
list of treatments with corresponding prices found in the diagnosis-related
groups (DRGs).34 This system also applied to physician reimbursement but
under a different title, the resource-based relative-value scale (RBRVS).35 The
payment plans incentivized hospitals to reduce excessive spending to ensure
reimbursement under this new value-based system.36 However, this
incentivized format of pricing gave CMS power to regulate pricing by

28

THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. HEALTH LAW, supra note 11, at 747.
Id. at 748.
30
See id. at 751.
31
Id. at 753.
32
See PROBLEMS IN HEALTH CARE LAW: CHALLENGES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 10,
at 306.
33
See id.
34
Id. PPS is foundational to understanding the payment reimbursement systems within
Medicare Part A. It is only introduced here, but this Comment later provides a substantive
analysis for this payment system. See discussion infra IV.A.1.
35
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. HEALTH LAW, supra note 11, at 753.
36
See id.
29
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adjusting the DRGs and other formulas.37 Undoubtedly, Medicare
underwent a powerful expansion under this substantive change because
CMS, not the medical service provider, held the power to regulate the cost of
health care.38
The cost of services was not the only issue plaguing Medicare. At the time
of its enactment, the United States was undergoing a vital shift away from its
despicable past of racism by pursuing equality of persons in all respects.
Medicare faced the issue of providing federal funding for segregated
hospitals, which it addressed swiftly and effectively by withholding funds for
failure “to comply with Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.”39 This measure
proved to be highly successful.40 In fact, over 1,000 hospitals quickly
integrated without any major conflict—health care triumphed over evil
presuppositions.41
2.

Implementation of Parts C and D

By the end of the 20th century, the federal government resolved many of
the pitfalls that plagued Medicare since its inception, yet the government
continued to find new ways to increase health care coverage without taking
on further financial burdens. These new ways included creating additional
sub-programs to Medicare in addition to Parts A and B—Parts C and D.42
Congress enacted Parts C and D upon recognizing the burden that Medicare
placed on the federal budget.43 Therefore, the lawmakers sought to provide
additional means of care without increasing the cost.
In 1997, Congress passed the Balanced Budget Amendments (BBA),
adding Part C.44 BBA expands coverage of particular services and amends
certain regulatory systems.45 Specifically, BBA increased coverage by
reimbursing “inpatient, rehabilitation, skilled nursing facilities, and home
health services” and implemented provisions “reducing fraud and abuse.”46
37

Id.
Id.
39
See id. at 749.
40
Id.
41
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. HEALTH LAW, supra note 11, at 749.
42
Part C is codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-21. Part D is codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-101.
43
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. HEALTH LAW, supra note 11, at 756; Elizabeth A.
Weeks, Cooperative Federalism and Healthcare Reform: The Medicare Part D "Clawback"
Example, 1 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 79, 81–82 (2007).
44
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. HEALTH LAW, supra note 11, at 756 (Medicare Part C
is frequently referred as Medicare + Choice).
45
See id.
46
Id.
38
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Most notably, Part C promotes private insurance plans by allowing enrollees
to receive greater benefits without government subsidization.47
Congress later enacted Part D to Medicare which helped resolve the rising
cost of pharmaceuticals. Part D implements Part D Plans (PDPs) that allow
for the cost of outpatient prescription drugs to not fall solely on the shoulders
of the beneficiary.48 Issued drug payments are determined by formularies or
categories of drugs created by CMS.49 Parts C and D further show that
Medicare has exponentially expanded since its inception—from narrow
coverage for retirees undergoing shorter hospitalization to now subsidizing
outpatient drugs.
C.

Modern Medicare

Today’s Medicare system, with all of its expansions, has undergone recent
revamping under the Obama Administration’s Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (ACA).50 This legislation transformed delivery and
payment for health care. The ACA focuses on delivery and payment to ensure
that Medicare’s expenditures are cabined, allowing the program to remain
solvent and provide care for future generations of Americans.51
1.

The ACA’s Revamp of Medicare

In 2008, the pendulum of American political thought swung from
conservative to liberal ideology upon the election of President Obama. His
administration transformed health care regarding quality of care and
promotion of incentivized care in 2010 with the ACA.52 The ACA is an
expansive piece of legislation affecting many different facets of the healthcare
industry—the patient, hospital, physician, and insurance providers. The
ACA also introduced new methods to lower health care costs.
The ACA implements measures to promote reducing expenditures while
providing quality care. One measure is the Medicare Shared Savings
Program, which created accountable care organizations (ACOs) that include
groups of hospitals lowering the “aggregate annual cost” of Medicare
patients.53 If the ACO is successful and meets all prerequisites, the hospitals
47
48

Id. at 756–57.
PROBLEMS IN HEALTH CARE LAW: CHALLENGES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 10, at

306.
49

Id. (footnote omitted).
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat 119.
51
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. HEALTH LAW, supra note 11, at 760.
52
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat 119.
53
Jessica Mantel, Spending Medicare’s Dollars Wisely: Taking Aim at Hospitals’ Cultures
of Overtreatment, 49 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 121, 155 (2015).
50
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“receive a percentage of the savings.”54 If the ACO fails to be efficient and
reduce costs, then it is penalized by decreased reimbursements.55
Another measure is the Bundled Payments for Care Improvement
Initiative,56 which provides a new standardized form of payment.57 The
standard requires CMS to reimburse the hospitals in bundled payments for
four pre-determined “episodes of care.”58 Each episode contains a particular
service.59 If the health care provider treats the patient at a cost below the
episode of care, the health care provider profits because the reimbursements
are standardized.60 Standardization of prices encourages hospitals to cut costs
and emphasize efficiency when rendering care for the purpose of attaining
the highest reimbursement.
2.

Value-Based Payer System

The ACA also created the value-based payer system.61 This new system is
intended to incentivize hospitals to lower health care costs by rewarding a
top-performing hospital with higher reimbursements for delivery of care.62
At first, the system was meant to ensure that the quality of care was constantly
improving.63 However, CMS quickly realized that Medicare’s expenses
needed some regulation because costs were rising too quickly.64
As a component of this program, CMS instituted the Medicare Spending
per Beneficiary (MSPB) measure.65 Under MSPB, the services provided by
health care providers are measured against other providers to determine
whether the health care provider is giving treatment that is necessary and
relevant to the patient without overcharging Medicare through excessive
treatments with little efficacy.66 If a hospital is not efficient, it is penalized.67
Therefore, while the ACA endured aggressive political debate, it provides
many measures to decrease health care costs. Yet, these measures have many
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67

Id.
Id. at 156.
Id. at 154.
Id.
Id.
Mantel, supra note 53, at 154.
Id.
Id. at 150.
Id.
Id. at 151.
See id. at 152.
Mantel, supra note 53, at 152.
Id.
Id. at 153.
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deficiencies that are further discussed in this Comment.
3.

Premiums

Premiums make for a difficult conversation because they force patients to
make monthly payments to receive health care coverage. In the private health
insurance world, an insured person must pay premiums. The good news for
most beneficiaries of Part A is that they do not have to pay a premium.68
Part A coverage provides beneficiaries with a specific amount of coverage
for which they do not have to pay any premiums.69 However, premiums for
Part A do exist. Premium-free Part A requires the beneficiary to have “at least
[forty] quarters of Medicare-covered employment.”70 If the person does not
have history of paying into Medicare during forty quarters of employment,
then the person can still enroll in the program but must pay a monthly
premium.71 Through this premium, Medicare receives a continual flow of
income. The question becomes—is it enough?
4.

Deductibles

While Part A may be premium free, it is not deductible free. Deductibles
change on a yearly basis and are up to the discretion of the Secretary of the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).72 They are charged on a
per-benefit period basis.73 “A benefit period begins the day [the patient is]
admitted as an inpatient in a hospital or S[killed] N[nursing] F[acility].”74
The benefit period is not limited by year; therefore, one can have many
benefit periods in a year.75 This deductible covers sixty days from the day of
admission into the hospital.76 The deductible for 2020 was $1,408.77
If the patient’s condition necessitates a hospital or skilled nursing stay that

68

Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., 2020 Medicare Parts A & B Premiums and
Deductibles, CMS.GOV (Nov. 8, 2019), https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/fact-sheets/2020medicare-parts-b-premiums-and-deductibles [hereinafter Ctrs. For Medicare & Medicaid
Servs., 2020 Medicare].
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id. The premium changes depending on quarters worked, disabilities, and other
circumstances. Id.
72
42 U.S.C. § 1395e(b)(2).
73
THOMSON REUTERS, SOCIAL SECURITY LAW & PRACTICE § 60:84 (2021), Westlaw SSLP.
74
Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Medicare, Glossary - B,
https://www.medicare.gov/glossary/b (last visited Sept. 5, 2021).
75
THOMSON REUTERS, supra note 73, at § 60:84.
76
Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., 2020 Medicare, supra note 68.
77
Id.
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exceeds the sixty-day time frame, the patient must pay coinsurance.78 For
2020, the coinsurance payment was $352 per day.79 If the patient’s stay
exceeds ninety days, the patient must pay coinsurance for “lifetime reserve
days” which, for 2020, was $704 per day.80
Deductibles are standard in most insurance contexts. If CMS increased the
amount of the deductible, Medicare may cover less. However, will an increase
in deductibles sufficiently save money without frustrating the purpose of the
program—secure health care insurance for the retired and semi-retired
elderly community?

III. MEDICARE PART A’S IMPENDING INSOLVENCY
Burdens traditionally run tandem with benefits. Medicare’s expansive
benefits place significant burdens on the shoulders of the federal government
and hospitals. The weight of the burden will render the government unable
to provide substantial reimbursement, if any, to hospitals. If the government
fails to adequately reimburse hospitals, they will eventually curtail services
and benefits offered to Medicare patients. Hospitals will then resort to
recovering the balance of Medicare’s deficient reimbursement from nonMedicare patients.
A.

Medicare’s Significant Burden

Following many reforms, Medicare, after all the amendments, includes
four categories of beneficiaries. To qualify for Medicare, potential
beneficiaries must meet one of the following requirements:
(1) individuals aged sixty-five or older; (2) individuals who
are entitled to disability benefits for twenty-four months or
longer (but do not meet the age requirement); (3)
individuals with end-stage renal disease (“ESRD”) who
require dialysis or kidney transplant; and (4) certain
individuals who may purchase benefits under the Medicare
Program.81

78

Id.
Id.
80
Id.
81
HEALTH CARE FRAUD: ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE § 10.2 [2]; 42 U.S.C. § 1395c. In
2010, the ACA added one more category of qualification. Medicare now covers an individual
who has developed health complications after living in an area considered an
“environmental health hazard” that was subject to an emergency declaration pursuant to the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980. HEALTH
CARE FRAUD: ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE § 10.2, [2] n.2.
79
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These four categories undoubtedly expand Medicare’s coverage, requiring
more federal funds to subsidize people’s health care.
According to the Medicare Trustees Report, CMS’s annual report, 61.2
million people received Medicare benefits in 2019.82 In the first category, 52.6
million people qualified pursuant to the age requirement.83 The second
category included 8.7 million disabled Americans.84 These statistics reflect
Medicare Part A and B’s beneficiaries; however, some beneficiaries were also
enrolled in private plans under Part C.85 In providing coverage to all
beneficiaries, the cost of Medicare amounted to $796.2 billion, exceeding its
income of $794.8 billion.86 Furthermore, Medicare’s assets, in the form of
U.S. securities, decreased by over a billion dollars.87 As this financial data
indicates, Medicare Part A is a program providing expansive coverage with
insufficient funds to match the demand.
B.
The Issue Funnels Down to a Lack of Incentives on Both Sides of
Health Care Transactions
While more categories of coverage expand Medicare, the issue
predominantly centers around the amount and quality of care hospitals
render to each patient. Recent reforms demonstrate a trend to implement
limitations on coverage to eliminate extraneous treatments requested by the
patient or conducted by the hospital.88 However, the problem persists. The
American health care system ranks as one of the most expensive health care
systems, yet the “health care outcomes are among the lowest in the world”
regardless of a highly educated workforce and advanced technology.89
Recent improvements, like the ACA, create an incentive for hospitals to
increase efficiency, maintain quality, and lower costs—for example, the
ACA’s Hospital Value-Based Payer System.90 However, the value-based payer
system is insufficient, at least in its current form, to pull Medicare out of the
red by itself. Medicare needs an influx of money along with incentivized
reimbursements to be sustainable beyond the next decade.
82

H.R. DOC. NO. 116–22, at 6 (2020).
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id. CMS notes that 37% of the beneficiaries in 2019 were Part C beneficiaries. Id.
86
Id.
87
H.R. DOC. NO. 116–22, at 6.
88
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(o).
89
Marilyn L. Uzdavines, The Great American Health Care System and the Dire Need For
Change: Stark Law Reform as a Path to a Vital Future of Value-Based Care, 7 TEX. A&M L.
REV. 573, 574 (2020).
90
See id. at 575.
83
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Income for Medicare was meant to come from payroll taxes.91 Reforms
have provided supplementary methods to generate income, such as
premiums for otherwise non-qualifying Part A beneficiaries.92 The current
state of deductibles injures Medicare. The current deductible is not difficult
to meet through medical expenses. If the deductible is low, the patient does
not have an incentive to limit services. Once the deductible is met, the patient
is hardly hindered from requesting additional tests and quasi-diagnosisrelated procedures that are largely unnecessary.
C.

Prospective Problems

CMS is not ignorant of the fact that Medicare operates at a deficit, and, as
a result, it incessantly begs Congress and the American people to recognize
the rapid depletion of Medicare Part A’s funds. According to CMS, “[t]he
estimated depletion date for the H[ospital] I[nsurance] trust fund is 2026, 93
which was also stated in the previous year’s report.”94 The news gets worse:
“As in past years, the Trustees have determined that the fund is not
adequately financed over the next 10 years. HI income is projected to be
lower than last year’s estimates due to low payroll taxes.”95 These brief
excerpts reveal CMS’s urgency. While trying to consistently provide health
care to over 60 million people, Part A is establishing a history of operating on
deficient funding.96
Furthermore, CMS issued a “Medicare funding warning” in 2019.97 This
warning urges two important steps to resolve Part A’s deficient funds. First,
the President must provide a legislative solution to Congress.98 Second,
Congress must expediently examine the legislation and make a
determination on its passage.99 In 2019, CMS issued a similar warning of this
type for the third consecutive year.100 The problem is not hidden—Medicare
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Part A is projected to be insolvent in less than a decade.101 Who will tell the
recently retired construction worker fully expecting Social Security and
Medicare benefits that the person’s reasonable reliance on the country’s
promise of health care will not be honored?

IV. SOLUTIONS
CMS’s desperate call for more funding follows attempts to resolve high
expenditures in Medicare using the ACA and the regulatory power of CMS.
The cost of Medicare skyrocketed as beneficiaries and hospitals had little
reason to cabin costs when the government subsidized care. Medical
professionals focused primarily on quality of care with little concern of
overtreatment.102 Recent reforms of the ACA’s value-based payer system
incentivized hospitals to eliminate extraneous expenses by restricting
reimbursement to the hospital’s performance.103 As a result, hospital
executives shifted focus to secure higher reimbursement by emphasizing
efficient patient care.
However, these reforms have proven less effective than anticipated,
allowing the issue of overtreatment to persist. The value-based payer system
emphasizes efficiency when carrying out the treatment but does not address
the degree of necessity for the treatment itself.104 The surrounding procedures
undoubtedly require efficiency to cut unnecessary expenses, but the greatest
financial burden is the actual treatment. This Comment argues that Part A
statutes should be amended to allow the value-based payer system to impose
a mandatory determination of whether the procedure and surrounding
expenses are wasteful within the value-based incentive calculation.
Hospitals dominate the health care conversation; however, there is
another key party to this discussion: the patient. Each person expects, and
rightfully so, that he or she will receive proper care. Unfortunately, “proper
care” cannot serve as a standardized quantum of care or rule of law governing
the relevancy and necessity of care because of its subjective nature. For
example, one individual could expect the hospital to exhaust every measure
to remedy the ailment, while another may only expect the hospital to take
reasonable steps when providing treatments. Due to the subjective nature of
what constitutes proper care, hospitals must have some protection from
patients’ requests to exhaust all treatment methods. Hospitals can avoid
overtreatment by informing the patient that Part A does not cover the
101
102
103
104
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Id. at 152.
Id. at 151.
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extraneous treatment, and that if the patient insists on receiving the
additional care, the patient must provide an alternative form of payment.
Part A generally follows the same format as the traditional health care
model. However, Part A’s demand for premiums contrasts with the
traditional insurance model. It does not require most beneficiaries to pay
premiums; rather, only 1% of beneficiaries pay a premium.105 With so few
beneficiaries paying premiums, Part A leaves a source of consistent income
untapped. This Comment argues for a statute that mandates universal
premium payments by all beneficiaries. The premium can be as low as the
cost of a cup of coffee. The goal of the mandated premium is to provide a
consistent stream of income to a program operating at a deficit.
A.
Costs

Lower Waste by Over-Treatment of Patients to Reduce Health Care

Since Part A’s inception in 1965, the legislative and executive branches
have wrestled with the issue of how to address the program’s heavy financial
burden. One of the most fundamental ways to tackle this issue is by
modifying the payment systems. New reimbursement systems have saved
money for the federal government by pushing hospitals to increase efficiency
in patient care, but further reform in these reimbursement systems will better
sustain Part A in the long-term.
1.

Medicare’s Payment Systems

In 1983, Congress replaced Part A’s retrospective payment method with
standardized reimbursements for inpatient hospital care under the PPS
regime.106 PPS was the first push to narrow the extraneous expenses
burdening Part A. Prior to PPS, CMS reimbursed hospitals under a
reasonableness standard,107 which required reimbursements to amount to
“reasonable costs of services rendered.”108 This reasonable standard required
CMS and payment distributors to issue payments retroactively, meaning that
care was given, and the federal government reimbursed the hospital after the
hospital rendered services.109 The subsequent payment method did not
105
Part A Costs, MEDICARE.GOV, https://www.medicare.gov/your-medicare-costs/part-acosts (last visited Apr. 9, 2021); see Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., 2020 Medicare,
supra note 68.
106
PROBLEMS IN HEALTH CARE LAW: CHALLENGES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 10, at
306–07.
107
WOLTERS KLUWER, supra note 92, at 803.
108
Id.
109
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306.
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permit the government to mitigate costs. Ultimately, the government was
paying the actual cost of each treatment.110
PPS’s implementation transformed the reasonableness standard to
predetermined payment amounts designated by treatments categorized into
classes under DRGs.111 Classifications are constructed “on their discharge
diagnosis, complications, comorbidities, and whether certain procedures are
performed.”112 The patient’s care is classified “based on information
[contained in the beneficiary’s bill], including principal diagnosis, up to eight
additional diagnoses, and up to six procedures performed during the stay, as
well as age, sex, and discharge status [of the beneficiary].”113
The PPS system standardized reimbursement amounts.114 Standardization
led to incentive-based care.115 DRGs set the payment for the treatment with
specific parameters of coverage.116 If costs go beyond those parameters, the
federal government does not provide reimbursement.117 For example, if a
hospital fails to discharge a patient according to the timeframe specified in
the DRG, the hospital is not reimbursed for the extra care resulting in a loss
for the hospital.118
DRGs are at the center of the PPS. DRGs are flexible and subject to
constant change to meet the needs of health care as medicine and diseases
evolve. Following PPS’s inception, DRGs’ organization transformed into the
Medical Severity-DRG (MS-DRG).119 This organization regime remains in
use today.120 New regulations are instituted every year121 to ensure that “cases
are [properly] classified so each DRG is—(1) [c]linically coherent and (2)
[e]mbraces an acceptable range of resource consumption.”122 While flexible
110

WOLTERS KLUWER, supra note 92, at 803.
Id. at 819.
112
PROBLEMS IN HEALTH CARE LAW: CHALLENGES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 10, at
307 (citing 69 Fed. Reg. 48,916 (Aug. 11, 2004) (codified at 42 C.F.R. §§ 403, 412, 413, 418,
460, 480, 482, 483, 485, and 489)).
113
WOLTERS KLUWER, supra note 92, at 819.
114
PROBLEMS IN HEALTH CARE LAW: CHALLENGES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 10, at
308.
115
See id. at 308.
116
See id.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id. at 307.
120
PROBLEMS IN HEALTH CARE LAW: CHALLENGES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 10, at
307.
121
WOLTERS KLUWER, supra note 92, at 821.
122
42 C.F.R. § 412.10 (2021).
111

48

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16:1

but standardized payments eliminate the federal government’s obligation to
pay the actual cost of the treatment, they do not stifle the hospital’s
admittance of patients with dubious claims of need for care.123 Thus, the
problem of overtreatment persisted under PPS with little deterrence.124
2.

Cost-Incentivized Health Care

Following PPS’s implementation, Congress and CMS enacted other
programs within Part A to curtail extraneous spending.125 One of the most
impactful measures is the value-based payer system in the ACA, which
incentivizes hospitals to deliver quality and efficient care.126 The value-based
payer system, or value-based purchasing program, is paired with the DRGs
to either increase or decrease reimbursement to the hospital.127 Whether the
hospital increases or decreases its reimbursement amount is determined by
the hospital’s performance under particular standards for the specified
timeframe.128
The Hospital Value-Based Payer System129 (VBP) focuses on incentivizing
health care to ensure a high degree of quality in services.130 Quality of care is
measured by a hospital’s performance score, which determines the degree of
reimbursement.131 Thus, hospitals participating in the program are
incentivized to deliver quality care to achieve the best possible performance
score. This results in the hospital obtaining the fullest reimbursement
possible, which is referred to as the value-based incentive payment amount.132
The Hospital VBP incentive payment program involves a complex
123
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125
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formula to calculate a participating hospital’s reimbursement based on the
hospital’s performance in accordance with particular measures given by the
Secretary of HHS.133 The value-based payment amount calculation consists
of the reductions to the base operating DRGs multiplied by the value-based
incentive payment percentage.134 The base operating DRG is a rate
determined by the location that the hospital serves.135 DRGs account for the
varying costs of treatment depending on the location of the hospital.136
Because DRGs are geographically conscious, base payments are premised on
either “a labor-related or nonlabor share.”137 If the hospital is located in
Alaska or Hawaii, then the DRG is affected by the nonlabor share, which is
the cost of living.138 Otherwise, hospitals located in the continental U.S. are
subject to DRGs based on labor-related shares which are determined by a
wage index.139 The hospital’s location determines the wage-index.140 Add-on
payments to compensate the hospital for various conditions are largely not
included in the base operating DRG.141
The other component of the calculation is the value-based incentive
payment percentage. The value-based incentive payment percentage is the
product of the following: CMS’s “applicable percent, the
hospital’s . . . [p]erformance [s]core divided by 100, and the exchange
function slope.”142 CMS’s applicable percent is 2.0% for all years after 2016,
unless decided otherwise.143
Under Part A, CMS calculates the performance score of a hospital through
an extensive procedure.144 The process begins when the Secretary of HHS
provides measures.145 These measures are means of gauging the “quality of
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care.”146 Federal law requires that the measures meet requirements.147 One
requirement states that the measures, at a minimum, must account for “5
specific conditions or procedures,” which include “[a]cute myocardial
infarction,” “[h]eart failure,” “[p]neumonia,” “[s]urgeries,” and
“[h]ealthcare-associated infections.”148 Another requirement mandates the
Secretary to ensure that the efficiency of the hospital is included as a measure,
along with the “Medicare spending per beneficiary” (MSPB).149 MSPB is a
focal point of this Comment; however, in order to fully understand the
importance of MSPB, one must first become familiar with the role of MSPB
in the value-based payer calculation.
Following the development of the measures, the Secretary of HHS
provides performance standards sixty days in advance of the performance
period.150 The performance standards function as thresholds that the hospital
must meet or surpass for greater reimbursement.151 The Secretary determines
each performance standard based on the measures developed.152 The
Secretary, when deciding the standards, must consider four specific factors:
“(i) practical experience with the measures involved, including whether a
significant proportion of hospitals failed to meet the performance standard
during previous performance periods; (ii) historical performance standards;
(iii) improvement rates; and (iv) the opportunity for continued
improvement.”153 The performance standards serve as clearly delineated
criterions reflecting the purpose and goal of the corresponding measure to
best assess whether the hospital has met or exceeded CMS’s expectations.154
The next step in the process involves comparing the hospital’s
performance to the performance standards. This comparison results in the
performance score.155 The performance score indicates how closely the
hospital meets the performance standards reflected by the measures.156 CMS
ultimately decides whether the hospital has performed pursuant to the
146
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measure.157 The performance score awards points to a hospital based on the
greater of two scores—the achievement or improvement score.158 In
calculating the hospital’s performance pursuant to the measure, CMS awards
the hospital one to nine points if the hospital reaches or surpasses the
achievement threshold but fails to meet the measure’s benchmark.159 A
hospital may receive zero to nine points if the hospital reaches or surpasses
the improvement threshold but fails to meet the benchmark of the
measure.160 CMS can only award points for the hospital’s performance in a
measure if the hospital serves a minimum number of cases.161 If the hospital
scores points in both the achievement and improvement score categories,
then whichever score is greater will be used in calculating the hospital’s
ultimate performance score.162
A hospital’s performance relative to these measures determines its
performance score. To calculate the performance score, measures are
grouped to form “applicable domains.”163 Domains may change to adapt to
the constant evolution of the health care industry.164 CMS establishes these
domains and assigns various weights to each domain.165 For 2020, CMS
analyzed a hospital’s performance under four domains: clinical outcomes,
person and community engagement, safety, and efficiency and cost
reduction. Each domain composed 25% of the weight in determining the

157

Id.; see 42 C.F.R. § 412.165(a) (2020).
42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(o)(5)(B)(ii).
159
WOLTERS KLUWER, supra note 92, at 849; see 42 C.F.R. § 412.165(a)(2) (2020). The
achievement threshold is:
158

the median . . . of hospital performance on a measure during a baseline
period with respect to a fiscal year, for Hospital VBP Program measures
other than the measures in the Efficiency and Cost Reduction domain,
and the median . . . of hospital performance on a measure during the
performance period with respect to a fiscal year, for the measures in the
Efficiency and Cost Reduction domain.
42 C.F.R. § 412.160 (2020).
160
WOLTERS KLUWER, supra note 92, at 849; see 42 C.F.R. § 142.165(a)(3) (2020). The
improvement threshold is “an individual hospital’s performance level on a measure during
the baseline period with respect to a fiscal year.” 42 C.F.R. § 412.160 (2020).
161
42 C.F.R. § 412.165(a)(1) (2020).
162
42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(o)(5)(B)(ii).
163
42 C.F.R. § 412.160 (2020).
164
See WOLTERS KLUWER, supra note 92, at 849.
165
See id.

52

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16:1

hospital’s overall performance.166
A hospital’s point value across all domains makes up the total performance
score, which ranges between zero and one hundred.167 CMS follows the
process laid out in Medicare Part A regulation 42 C.F.R. § 412.165(b) to
ultimately determine the total performance score of a hospital. First, CMS
calculates the domain score of the hospital only after the hospital meets “the
minimum threshold of measures in the domain.”168 In other words, the
hospital must provide a certain amount of treatment in order for CMS to
have sufficient data to compare the hospital’s performance to the measures.
Second, CMS calculates the unweighted domain score which is the sum of all
measures in a domain.169 Third, CMS normalizes the unweighted domain
score to be “expressed as a percentage of points earned out of 100.”170 Fourth,
CMS further standardizes the unweighted domain score by weighing the
score against CMS’s finalized domain weights.171 Lastly, CMS calculates the
hospital’s total performance score by adding all the hospital’s weighed
domain scores.172
The calculation process is extensive and complicated. The applicable
domains are essentially the standard that the hospital’s performance must
meet; therefore, the applicable domains are the best means to prohibit,
166
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https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Quality-Initiatives-Patient-AssessmentInstruments/HospitalQualityInits/Hospital-Value-Based-Purchasing- (Feb. 18, 2021, 3:03
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Program FY 2018-2026 Measures, CMS.GOV
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under the first measure, a hospital’s performance is measured by the thirty-day mortality rate
when it treats patients with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. Id. CMS changed the
second domain’s label from patient and caregiver-centered experience of care/care
coordination to person and community engagement. WOLTERS KLUWER, supra note 92, at
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restrict, or promote a particular hospital-related activity. However, the
applicable domains focus on efficiency and quality of care in relation to the
commencement of the procedure or treatment.173 The applicable domains fail
to address whether the procedure or treatment itself is essential to the health
of the patient, which results in the potential for wasteful and expensive care.
CMS attempted to address this problem with the MSPB.174
(1)

Medicare spending per beneficiary measures

If quality of care is the primary focus, the ACA’s Hospital VBP is
insufficient to cut costs. So CMS instituted incentives for hospitals to increase
the level of efficiency in how they provide health care which resulted in the
Medicare Spending per Beneficiary measure.175 The MSPB is a measure
contained within the cost and efficiency applicable domain, which “compares
a hospital’s overall efficiency relative to the median hospital.”176 The measure
examines a narrow timeframe—from three days prior to the patient entering
the hospital to thirty days following discharge.177 The MSPB rewards
hospitals that treat the patient with lower costs by increasing the hospital’s
efficiency score; conversely, the hospital that treats the patient with higher
costs is punished with a lower efficiency score.178 Yet, this measure fails to
fully address overtreatment. The measure focuses on the cost and efficiency
of the prescribed treatment without addressing the issue of overtreatment.179
Professor Jessica Mantel at the University of Houston Law Center noted
that the cost and efficiency measures do not stop hospitals from two forms of
overtreatment.180 The first form of overtreatment is at the inception of the
patient-hospital relationship; more specifically, the measures contained
within the cost and efficiency domain fail to account for whether the
individual even needs to be admitted to the hospital.181 In her discussion of
overtreatment, Professor Mantel cites an article published in the New
England Journal of Medicine, a prominent medical journal, which reveals
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that hospitals recommend the costliest avenue for treatment—surgery.182
This recommendation is made even when other treatment options, which are
less expensive and carry fewer risks, may be more appropriate. Notably,
hospitals have promoted the use of spinal-fusion surgery for patients with
pre-existing conditions absent any data indicating that the expensive surgery
is the most effective treatment under such pre-existing conditions.183 Doctors
commit waste when they order a surgery where other less expensive measures
would serve the same purpose with less risk and expense.
The second form of overtreatment that MSPB overlooks is the outpatient
expenses caused by the narrow timeframe of MSPB—three days prior to the
admission of the patient to thirty days following discharge.184 The hospital
may create an environment that promotes doctors encouraging patient
participation in expensive outpatient services, which may exceed the thirty
day window.185 Professor Mantel summarizes the prevailing issue in the
following way: “[T]he current Hospital VBP Program serves as a partial and
imperfect tool for addressing hospitals’ cultures for overtreatment.”186
(2)
Mandatory waste provision to minimize
overtreatment
Problems of overtreatment and hospitalization result in waste. Waste is an
unnecessary drain on Part A, a program already plagued with financial
difficulties. Thus, efforts to minimize waste are necessary to preserve
coverage for future generations. The efforts laid out in regulations and
codified in statutes have so far failed to solve the essential problem—waste in
the form of overtreatment. For this reason, this Comment argues for the
addition of a provision in 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(o)(3)(D) requiring the
Secretary, when determining performance standards, to consider waste—
defined as overtreatment by excessive inpatient treatment, excessive
outpatient treatment, or unnecessary admission of a patient.
Under the added provision, the Secretary should consider waste per the
182
Id. (citing Richard A. Deyo et al., Spinal-Fusion Surgery—The Case for Restraint, 350
NEW ENG. J. MED. 722 (2004)).
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given definition when developing measures for the respective fiscal year.
Possible implementation of the measures includes an examination of the
rates of retesting prior to any mandatory retesting, the rate of admission of a
patient for an expensive procedure lacking clear data indicative of the
procedure’s overweighing benefit, or the rate of admission to the hospital
when non-hospital medical services are best suited. These measures are
simply suggestions and by no means limit other measures the Secretary may
implement to minimize waste.
A measure, such as the rate of retests prior to a mandatory retest of a
patient, examines whether the patient is subjected to unnecessary testing.
Patients are often given more testing than necessary, which ultimately
increases the costs paid by Medicare for that patient’s health care.187 The
danger of unnecessary tests may supersede any diagnostic value.188 Several
doctors at the University of Texas Medical Branch in Galveston conducted a
study exposing the rate of excessive colonoscopies.189 The study involved a
testing pool of Medicare beneficiaries under Parts A and B who underwent
colonoscopies for cancer screening.190 At the time of the study, CMS
regulated reimbursement for a colonoscopy to one every ten years; however,
the study found that many of the beneficiaries were retested earlier than the
ten year mark.191 CMS recognized this issue and regulated accordingly.
However, the issue of retesting persists in areas other than colonoscopy
screening for cancer, such as imaging stress tests and pulmonary function
tests.192
Dr. Konger and his colleagues, who conducted the study at the University
of Texas Medical Branch in Galveston, specifically mentioned that laboratory
and pathology tests are expensive bearing a heavy burden on Medicare.193 A
possible cause for the expense is retesting the patient for various reasons.194
One reason involves tests ordered by different doctors who fail to look at
what previous or other doctors have ordered.195 Other reasons include tests
given in a narrow timeframe that do not allow for any changes in the patient’s
187
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condition or for a mistake in one test that is part of a large panel of testing.196
As evidenced by Dr. Konger’s study, a measure to eliminate waste may
decrease the likelihood of extraneous retesting, which would lower the cost
of health care.
If the Secretary must account for waste, specifically in the form of
overtreatment, then Part A will be less burdened by unnecessary expenses.
Conservation and necessity must be guiding principles to cabin Part A
spending, as its funding is projected to be gone in a decade.197 Factoring a
hospital’s waste in its reimbursement analysis helps to avoid superficial and
futile treatments that burden the dwindling funds to nothing, rendering
untenable the American promise of health care to the elderly.
B.

Mandate Universal Premiums to Increase Income

The adage, “a penny saved is a penny earned” is undoubtedly true, but Part
A requires more than a penny saved to be sustainable. Premiums allow for
the influx of money into the program. Presently, few beneficiaries of Part A
pay a premium.198 The program has millions of enrollees, as previously noted,
yet most of these enrollees pay into the system solely through deductions
from paychecks throughout their professional life, absent Medigap insurance
or any other supplemental insurance.199 This large body of “premium-free
Part A” beneficiaries (hereinafter referred to as “qualifying beneficiaries”)
provides a prime, untapped group to pay premiums allowing for increased
funding to the program.200
1.

Who Pays Premiums?

A divide exists as to who pays premiums in Medicare Part A, which
contrasts with the premium requirement in Parts B and D.201 Under Parts B
and D, beneficiaries must pay premiums.202 Conversely, if the Part A enrollee
meets particular qualifications, which most do, then the enrollee is a
beneficiary absent any premium.203 If the enrollee receives benefits from
Social Security or the Railroad Retirement Board and the individual is sixty-
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five, then Medicare Part A is premium-free.204 If the enrollee fails to meet the
age qualification of sixty-five, then the enrollee may still qualify for premiumfree health care if the individual receives Social Security or benefits for
disabilities for twenty-four months, or has ESRD.205 Furthermore, the
enrollee must pay into the system long enough to be eligible for Social
Security.206 The work requirement is met by “earning a sufficient
amount . . . for at least [forty] calendar ‘quarters.’”207
If the enrollee does not qualify for Part A, the enrollee may still enroll for
the program by paying monthly premiums (hereinafter referred to as
“purchasing beneficiaries”).208 In 2020, the premium for Part A was $458 per
month.209 However, a decrease in the monthly premium may occur
depending on the number of quarters of coverage the beneficiary worked.210
The threshold number of quarters to decrease the monthly premium is thirty
quarters.211 In 2020, thirty quarters of coverage required the enrollee to pay
$252 in monthly premiums.212 The beneficiary does not have to work the
quarters of coverage; rather, the beneficiary may be married to the individual
who worked for the quarters.213
Commonly, the enrollee meets the qualifications, entitling that individual
to premium-free health care.214 In its annual statement of premiums and
deductibles for the upcoming fiscal year, CMS stated that 99% of beneficiaries
are premium-free beneficiaries.215 Therefore, 99% of at least 60 million people
do not pay premiums for their health insurance—approximately 59,400,000
people.216
The divide in enrollees paying monthly premiums for coverage is
purposeful. Part A was intended as a program that is “self-financed, almost
entirely, through taxes paid on wages and other earned income throughout a
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person’s working life.”217 However, if Part A is to continue, this must change.
The program’s dire state necessitates steady income from the insureds and
not solely spending money on the majority of the insureds.
2.

Mandated Premiums Statute

Millions of Americans pay for Part A throughout their working lives
through taxes automatically withdrawn from each paycheck. Upon
retirement, these Americans stop making payments to the program via taxes
and instead begin drawing on their lifelong investment by visiting hospitals
and receiving care through Medicare. The idea behind Part A is that the
workforce remains sufficiently populated in order to continue the steady flow
of income. The workforce is continually taxed to pay for the health care of
those who have already retired. However, what happens if the American
population greatly decreases or a recession similar to 2007 reoccurs? What
happens when the baby boomer generation fully retires and health care costs
continue to rise?218 Part A is on the brink of bankruptcy, as it is operating on
a deficit basis, so such circumstances would render it unable to afford to pay
for current beneficiaries’ care. Possible remedies incite little enthusiasm.
This Comment argues for the enactment of a statute mandating a
premium for all beneficiaries at varying amounts. While mandatory
premiums appear contrary to the purpose of Part A, it would allow the idea
of pre-paid health care to remain in the program. The statute will require
individuals who are entitled to premium-free Part A coverage to pay only a
minimal payment. As a result, the small premiums combined with the
existing purchasing beneficiaries will create an influx of income for Medicare
Part A.
3.

Introduction of Premiums in Part A

Evidence supports the enactment of a statute mandating premiums.
Premiums imposed on beneficiaries of other Parts in Medicare and the
comparison of the benefits of fully retired beneficiaries to the benefits of
quasi-retired beneficiaries support the argument that all Medicare
beneficiaries should pay premiums. Again, while this possible solution to
Medicare Part A’s dissolution is not exciting, it is necessary to avoid fullfledged bankruptcy of the insurer for the elderly.
Part A’s funding metric greatly differs from Parts B and D. Parts B and D
permit beneficiaries to have additional benefits, like reimbursement for
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outpatient drugs or coverage for additional services.219 As noted previously,
Parts B and D charge premiums for this additional coverage.220 Part B has
premiums that fluctuate based on the beneficiary’s tax filing status.221 In 2020,
Part B’s premium for an individual who filed a tax return with a reported
income of $87,000 or less was $144.60 per month.222 An individual who filed
a tax return with an annual income of $500,000 or more paid a monthly
premium of $491.60.223 According to CMS, most Part B beneficiaries paid the
“standard amount” of $144.60.224
Part D’s premiums follow a similar pattern.225 However, the nature of a
Part D plan is that each plan is different, with varying benefits at respective
prices.226 The premiums set in the plan227 are adjusted according to the
beneficiary’s income.228 The adjustment is an additional amount owed that
varies based on a person’s tax filing status and annual income.229 For example,
an individual making $87,000 or less pays only the premium of the plan the
beneficiary selected.230 If the individual makes over $500,000, then the person
pays $76.40 every month, in addition to the monthly premium contained in
the selected plan.231
The fluctuating, but lower, payment amounts in Parts B and D support the
feasibility of a mandatory premium for Part A beneficiaries. A mandatory
premium would provide income for the program without overburdening the
beneficiaries and frustrating its purpose. To illustrate, if the statute mandates
that every qualifying Part A beneficiary pay $144.60 annually, which would
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be required for 99%232 of the 60 million233 beneficiaries, then $8,592,804,000
is contributed to Medicare Part A.234 As previously noted, Medicare costs are
$796.2 billion235 with only $794.8 billion236 as available funding; therefore,
collecting premiums amounting to over $8 billion will rectify the deficit.
Aside from Parts B and D premiums, evidence supports that a mandatory
premium does not punish beneficiaries who are semi-retired. Medicare and
Social Security are both subsidized through payroll taxes.237 As a result,
workers pay their contributions every paycheck, while those who do not work
make no contribution. A quasi-retired individual who chooses to work is
stuck having to pay into the program. The quasi-retired have less incentive
to continue participating in the workforce if they are paying into a program
that they are using, while their retired colleagues make no contribution and
only drain the program. Therefore, establishing a universal premium does
not disincentivize the semi-retired beneficiaries by continually forcing them
to contribute to Part A, while a majority of Part A beneficiaries, who are fully
retired, do not contribute.
A foreseeable argument against a mandatory premium is: what happens to
the elderly individual who cannot make the monthly premiums? This
argument highlights the important concern of imposing additional expenses
on a person in excess of the amount contributed to the program over a
lifetime. However, there are several solutions to resolve this concern. First, if
an elderly individual has severe financial complications, then that person
may enroll in Medicaid.238 Medicaid “serves low-income people of every age.
Patients usually pay no part of costs for covered medical expenses.”239 Second,
CMS may set the premium at a minimal amount to ensure the population’s
overall ability to pay the premium. The amount can start from as little as a
cup of coffee to the minimum premium amount for Part B, $144.60.240
The enactment of a statute mandating premiums provides income for Part
232

See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., 2020 Medicare, supra note 68.
H.R. DOC. NO. 116–122, at 6 (2020).
234
The formula used in this illustration is $144.60 x (99% of 60,000,000).
235
H.R. DOC. NO. 116–122, at 6.
236
Id.
237
See PROBLEMS IN HEALTH CARE LAW: CHALLENGES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note
10, at 306.
238
Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., What is the Difference Between Medicare and
Medicaid?, https://www.hhs.gov
/answers/medicare-and-medicaid/what-is-the-difference-between-medicaremedicaid/index.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2021).
239
Id.
240
See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., 2020 Medicare, supra note 68.
233

2021] THE SOLUTION TO MEDICARE PART A INSOLVENCY 61
A as health care costs increase and available funds continue to deplete. CMS
has already made use of a mandatory premium system in Parts B and D,
which have successfully funded Parts B and D for many years.241 Further,
quasi-retired individuals already are required to pay into the program even if
they are beneficiaries. As a result, beneficiaries are disincentivized to
continue working—quasi-retired individuals pay while fully-retired
individuals only pay deductibles and coinsurance payments. This proposal
advantages some but might disadvantage those who may struggle to afford a
monthly premium on top of their living costs. The affordability of the
premium is, of course, a great concern, but CMS can easily require a very low
premium amount. Therefore, a mandatory premium best accomplishes the
goal of increasing income into the Part A program.

V. CONCLUSION
Upon reaching the retirement age of sixty-five, Americans expect that the
program they paid into throughout their working lives is capable of
sustaining them. However, CMS’s reports continually warn lawmakers of
Medicare’s impending bankruptcy. If this problem remains unaddressed,
millions of Americans will be disappointed in their government’s failed
promise to provide health care in their old age.
Medicare’s expansion has provided increased health care for millions of
Americans. Further, Americans have alternative ways to afford health care
through purchasing additional care under Part B, savings plans in Part C, or
drug-purchasing plans under Part D. While there are alternative ways to
afford care, the price of health care increases with evolving technology and
methodologies. The expansion of health care coverage with ever-increasing
costs proves to be an overwhelming burden on the program.
Under Part A, the program originated as a program that covered limited
services for only the elderly population. Following decades of amendments,
Medicare now provides coverage for millions who are disabled or contract a
particular illness, and more services than ever are now covered. Part A is not
intended to provide such a broad sweep of coverage with skyrocketing costs.
Therefore, under the current paradigm, Part A is struggling and will soon
falter.
All is not doom and gloom. There are solutions that lawmakers can enact
to sustain Medicare Part A. The solution is plain and simple on the surface—
lower health care costs and increase income to the program. However,
implementation of this solution is difficult because the government is tasked
with deciding whether services are curtailed, heavier taxes are imposed, or
241
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both.
The ACA attempted to fix Part A. It introduced an incentive-based care
metric into Medicare, the Hospital VBP. This new system changed how
health care is delivered to patients—quality of care and patient satisfaction
are central. Issues continue as health care costs do not decrease.
Cost and efficiency must be central to the health care delivery system to
sustain Part A. An amendment to 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(o)(3)(D), requiring
the Secretary to consider waste when determining performance scores, would
accomplish a sustainable health care delivery paradigm. When measuring the
performance of a hospital, waste must be examined to determine whether the
hospital is wasteful through extraneous treatments. In its current state, Part
A is unable to afford unnecessary treatments. Implementation of this
amendment will not change the focus of health care from quality of care to
solely financial incentives. Instead, it will force medical professionals to be
thorough during initial patient examinations. Most importantly, this
amendment will eliminate extraneous spending by medical professionals.
While saving money is important, Medicare must not operate at a
consistent deficit. Currently, Medicare has qualifying and purchasing
beneficiaries. Qualifying beneficiaries do not contribute to the program
following enrollment because they qualify. However, beneficiaries that do not
meet the eligibility requirements may still enroll in the program by
contributing monthly premium payments. Therefore, a small portion of
beneficiaries make regular contributions to the program in addition to the
payroll taxes of the population. These methods are no longer viable with the
increased cost of health care. The enactment of a statute mandating
premiums for qualifying beneficiaries provides income for Medicare for
more than one generation.
A mandatory premium for qualifying beneficiaries provides a new avenue
of income for the program. Premiums are no stranger to the Medicare
system, as premiums are already a mandatory component of Parts B and D.
Further, premiums ensure that no quasi-retiree is subject to paying payroll
taxes to Medicare while a fully retired person is not.
Lawmakers can no longer be silent on Medicare. The U.S. government
promised Americans in 1965 that their contributions from their paychecks
shall be rewarded with health care at the age of sixty-five. CMS is pleading
with lawmakers and Americans—Medicare Part A is in a desperate state;
change must happen.

